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ABSTRACT
There are many estimates of the effect of college quality on students’ subsequent earnings.  One
difficulty interpreting past estimates, however, is that elite colleges admit students, in part, based on
characteristics that are related to their earnings capacity. Since some of these characteristics are
unobserved by researchers who later estimate wage equations, it is difficult to parse out the effect of
attending a selective college from the students’ pre-college characteristics.  This paper uses information on
the set of colleges at which students were accepted and rejected to remove the effect of unobserved
characteristics that influence college admission.  Specifically, we match students in the newly colleted
College and Beyond (C&B) Data Set who were admitted to and rejected from a similar set of institutions,
and estimate fixed effects models.  As another approach to adjust for selection bias, we control for the
average SAT score of the schools to which students applied using both the C&B and National Longitudinal
Survey of the High School Class of 1972.  We find that students who attended more selective colleges do
not earn more than other students who were accepted and rejected by comparable schools but attended
less selective colleges.  However, the average tuition charged by the school is significantly related to the
students’ subsequent earnings.  Indeed, we find a substantial internal rate of return from attending a more
costly college. Lastly, the payoff to attending an elite college appears to be greater for students from more
disadvantaged family backgrounds.
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The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation Woodrow Wilson School
282 Alexander Road Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08540 Princeton, NJ 08544
and NBER
akrueger@pucc.princeton.eduA burgeoning literature has addressed the question, "Does the 'quality' of the college that
students attend influence their subsequent earnings?" Obtaining accurate estimates of thepayoff to
attending a higher quality undergraduate institution is of obvious importance to the parents of
prospective students who foot the tuition bills, and to the students themselves. In addition, because
college selectivity is typically measured by the average characteristics (e.g., average SAT score) of
classmates, the literature is closely coimected to theoretical and empirical studies of peer group
effects on individual behavior. And with higher education making up 40 percent of total
educational expenditures in the United States (see U.S. Department of Education, 1997; Table 33),
understandingthe impact of selective colleges on students' labor market outcomes is central for
understanding the role of human capital.2
Past studies have found that students who attended colleges with higher average SAT
scores or higher tuition tend to have higher earnings when they are observed in the labor market.
Attending a college with a 100 point higher average SAT is associated with 3to7 percent higher
earnings later in life (see, e.g., Kane, 1998). An obvious concern with this conclusion, however,
is that students who attend more elite colleges may have greater earnings capacity regardless of
where they attend school. Indeed, the very attributes that lead admissions committees to select
certain applicants for admission may also be rewarded in the labor market. Most past studies
have used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis to attempt to control for differences in
student attributes that are correlated with earnings and college quality. But college admissions
'The modern literature began with papers by Hunt (1963), Solnion (1973), Wales (1973), Solmon and Wachtel (1975),
and Wise (1975), and has undergone a recent renaissance, with papers by Brewer and Ehrenberg (1996), Behrman et al.
(1996), Daniel (1997), Kane (1998), and others. See Brewer and Ehrenberg (1996; Table 1) for an excellent summary
of the literature.
2This figure ignores any earnings students forego while attending school, which would increase the relative cost of
higher education.decisions are based in part on student characteristics that are unobservedby researchers and
therefore not held constant in the estimated wage equations; if these unobserved characteristicsare
positively correlated with wages, then OLS estimates will overstate the payoff to attendinga
selective school. Only three previous papers that we are aware of haveattempted to adjust for
selection on unobserved variables in estimating the payoff to attending an elite college. Brewer and
Ehrenberg (1996) use a parametric utility maximizing framework to model students' choice of
schools, under the assumption that all students can attend any school they desire. Behrman,
Rosenzweig and Taubman (1996) utilize data on female twins to difference out common
unobserved effects. And Berhman, et al. (1996) use family variables to instrument forcollege
choice. Our paper complements these previous approaches.
This paper employs two new approaches to adjust for nonrandom selection of studentson
the part of elite colleges. In one approach, we only compare college quality and earningsamong
students who were accepted and rejected by a comparable set of colleges, and are comparable in
terms of observable variables. In the second approach, we hold constant theaverage SAT score of
the schools to which each student applied, as well as theaverage SAT score of the school the
student attended, the student's SAT score, and other variables. The second approach is nested in the
first estimator. Conditions under which these estimators provide unbiased estimates of the payoff
to college quality are discussed in the next section. In short, if admission to a college is based on a
set of variables that are observed by the admissions committee and later by the econometrician
(e.g., student SAT), and another set of variables that is observed by the admissions committee (e.g.,
an assessment of student motivation) but not by the econometrician, and if both sets of variables
influence earnings, then looking within matched sets of students who were accepted and rejected by3
the same groups of colleges can help overcome selection bias.
Bamow, Goldberger and Cain (1981) point out that, "Unbiasedness is attainable when the
variables that determined the assignment rule are known, quantified, and included in the
[regression] equation." Our first estimator extends the concept of "selection on the observables" to
"selection on the observables and unobservables," since information on the unobservables can be
inferred from the outcomes of independent admission decisions by the schools the student applied
to. The general idea of using information reflected in the outcome of independent screens to
control for selection bias may have applications to other estimation problems, such as estimating
wage differentials associated with working in different industries or sizes of firms (where hiring
decisions during the job search process provide screens) and racial differences in mortgage defaults
(where denials or acceptances of applications for loans provide screens).3
We provide selection-corrected estimates of the payoff to school quality using the
College and Beyond dataset, which was recently collected by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation
and analyzed extensively in Bowen and Bok (1992), and the National Longitudinal Survey of the
High School Class of 1972 (NLS-72). We examine the effect on earnings of several school
quality indicators, including selectivity (as measured by .the school's average SAT score) and net
tuition. Our primary finding is that the financial return to attending a higher quality college falls
considerably once we adjust for selection on the part of the college. Nonetheless, we still find a
substantial payoff to attending schools with higher net tuition. Finally, we examine the impact of
attending a more selective college on students' grades, graduation rates, and post-college
3Braun and Szatrowjcsj (1984) use a related idea to evaluate law school grades across institutions by comparing the
performance of students who were accepted at a common set of law schools but attended different schools.4
educational attainment.
1. Simulation of Admissions, College Attendance and Earnings
For most students, college attendance involves three sequential choices. First, a student
decides which set of colleges to apply to for admission. Second, colleges independently decide
whether to admit the student to their schools. Third, the student and her parents decide which
college the student will attend from the subset of colleges that admitted her.
We begin by assuming that colleges determine admissions decisions by weighing various
attributes of the student. Indeed, a recent survey by the National Association for College
Admission Counseling indicates that admissions officers consider many factors when selecting
students, including not only students' high school grades and test scores, but also factors such as
their essays, counselor and teacher recommendations, community service, and extracurricular
activities (NACAC Bulletin, November, 1998). Next, we assume that each college uses a threshold
to make admissions decisions. An applicant who possesses characteristics that place him or her
above the college's threshold is accepted; if not, he or she is rejected. Additionally, luckmay enter
into the admission decision.
To proceed analytically, we partition the characteristics that the admissions committee
observes into two sets of variables: a set that is subsequently observable by researchers, denoted X1,
and a set that is unobservable by researchers, denoted X2. The observable set of characteristics
could include factors such as the student's SAT score and high school grade point average (GPA),
whereas the unobservable set could include factors such as assessments of the student's motivation,
ambition and maturity as reflected in her essay, college interview and letters of recommendation.5
Withoutloss of generality, assume that X and X2arescalar variables. We assume a linear
admission rule, in which X1 and X2 have been scaled accordingly. In particular, we assume college
j uses the following rule to admit or reject applicant i:
(1) if Z =X1 +X2+e.> C then admit to collegej
otherwise reject applicant at college j
where Z is the latent quality of the student as judged by the admission committee,represents the
idiosyncratic, views of college js admission committee, and C is the cutoff quality level the college
uses for admission.4 The term e1 represents luck arid idiosyncratic factors that affect admission
decisions but are unrelated to earnings. We assume ; is independent across colleges. By
definition, more selective colleges have higher values of C.
Now suppose the "structural earnings function" relating income to the students' attributes is:
(2)in W1 =+I3ISAT. + f32X11+f33X2+
where SAT. is the average SAT score of matriculants at the college student i attended, X1 and X2
are the two sets of characteristics used by the admission committee to determine admission, and c,
is an idiosyncratic error term that is uncorrelated with the other variables on the right hand side of
(2). Since individual SAT scores are a common X variable, SATJ. can be thought of as the mean
of X1 taken over students who attend college j'. The parameter 13, which may or may not equal
zero, represents the monetary payoff to attending a more selective college.
In practice, researchers have been forced to estimate a wage equation that omits X2:
(3) in=+'ISATJ + j3'2X1 + u.
4We ignore the possibility of wait listing the student.6
Even if students randomly select the college they attend from the set of colleges that admitted them,
estimation of (3) will yield biased and inconsistent parameter estimates of 13 and f2.Most
importantly for our purposes, if students choose their school randomly from their set of options, the
payoff to attending a selective school will be biased upward because students with higher values of
the omitted variable, X2, are more likely to be admitted to, and therefore attend, highly selective
schools. Since the labor market rewards X2, and school-average SAT and X2 are positively
correlated, the coefficient on school-average SAT will be biased upward. The coefficient on X1 can
be positively or negatively biased, depending on the relationship between X1 and X,. Also notice
that the greater the correlation between X1 and X2, the lesser the bias in I3I.5
Formally, the coefficient on school-average SAT score is biased upward in this situation
because E(ln W1 SAT.,XI) =13+ 3ISATJ. + 132X1 + E(u1 X1 + X2 + e1. > The expected
value of the error term (u1) is higher for students who were admitted to, and therefore more likely to
attend, more selective schools.6
If, conditional on gaining admission, students choose to attend schools for reasons that are
independent of X2 and ,thenstudents who were accepted and rejected by the same set of schools
would have the same expected value of u. Consequently, our proposed solution to the school
selection problem is to include an unrestricted set of dummy variables indicating groups of students
who received the same admissions decisions (i.e., the same combination of acceptances and
rejections) from the same set of colleges. Including these dummy variables absorbs the conditional
5This should be intuitively clear from considering a situation in which X and X2 are perfectly correlated. In this case,
the school average SAT is unaffected by the omitted X2, although the coefficient on X confounds the effect of X and
x2.
6Aclassic reference on selection bias is Heckman (1979).7
expectation of the error term if students randomly choose to attend a school from the set of schools
that admitted them. Moreover, even if college matriculation decisions (conditional on acceptance)
are related to X2, controlling for dummies indicating whether students were accepted and rejected
by the same sets of schools absorbs some of the effect of the unobserved X2.
To see why controlling for dummies indicating acceptance and rejection at a common set of
schools partially controls for the effect of X2, consider two colleges that a subset of students applied
to with admission thresholds C1 <C2. In other words, college 2 is more selective than college 1. If
the selection rule in equation (1) did not depend on a random factor, then it would be unambiguous
that students who were admitted to college 1 and rejected by college 2 possessed characteristics
such that C1 <X1+X2<C2.As C1 approaches C2, the sum of the students' observed and
unobserved characteristics becomes uniquely identified by observations on acceptance and rejection
decisions.7 If enough accept and reject decisions over a fine enough range of college selectivity
levels are observed, then students with a similar history of acceptances and rejections willpossess
essentially the same average value of the observed and unobserved traits used by colleges to make
admission decisions. Thus, even if matriculation decisions are dependent on X2, we can at least
partially control for X2 by grouping together students who were admitted to and rejected by the
same set of colleges and including dummy variables indicating each of these groups in the wage
regression. Notice that to apply this estimator, it is necessary for students to be accepted by a
diverse set of schools and for some of those students to attend the less selective colleges and others
the more selective colleges from their menu of choices.
7The fact that idiosyncratic factors affect colleges' admissions decisions throughe13 complicates, but does not distort, the
inference that students who have been accepted and rejected by the same schools have similar values of X1 +X2.8
The following simulations illustrate these points, and suggest that information on a
relatively small number of college application outcomes is sufficient to reduce or eliminate the bias
caused by unobserved variables that influence college admission decisions. For a sample of 4,000
observations, we simulated data as follows. We assume X1, X2 and e1 are standard normal,
independently distributed variables. Every student applies to the same four colleges, and each
college has a different value of C. The values of C are set so that the most selective college admits
approximately the top 12 percent of applicants, the second most selective college admits the top 50
percent, the third most selective college admits the top 70 percent, and the least selective college
admits all applicants. A randomly selected quarter of students choose to attend the best school they
were admitted to, and the remaining students randomly select which college to attend from among
the ones that admitted them.8 We calculate each college's average SAT score by averaging over X1
for the students who attend the college. This acceptance and matriculation process naturally leads
more selective colleges to have higher average SAT scores. We assume the structural wage
equation specified in (2), and set 13= 0and 13= 132 133=0.5and draw ,froma standard normal
distribution.
Panel A of Table 1 reports average regression statistics from 100 simulations of this model.
As one would expect from the initial assumptions, a regression of mW on SAT, X1 and X2 yields a
coefficient of virtually 0 on school-average SAT (see column 1). If we omit X2 from the model,
however, the coefficient on school-average SAT averages .58 in the simulations, and the coefficient
8Random selection of colleges on the part of students is obviously an unreasonable assumption, but as mentioned, for
our selection correction to work all that is required is that the choice of college is independent of the error term in wage
equation (2) and of X2.9
on X, falls to .42 (see column 2). In column 3 we implement our selection correction method.
That is, we create 16 dummy variables indicating possible combinations of acceptances and
rejections at the 4 schools, and include 15 of these dummies as explanatory variables.'0 Including
these dummy variables drives the coefficient on the school-average SAT score toward 0. Note also
that the coefficient on X1 falls to .26 when the admitlreject dummies are included. This occurs
because X1 + X2 is only controlled imperfectly by the accept/reject dummies, so X1 still has some
independent explanatory power." Consequently, it is inappropriate to interpret the coefficient on X1
as a structural parameter in the selection-corrected model, even though the estimate of 13, is
unbiased.
If the admission rule used by colleges depended only on X,, and if X, were included in the
wage equation, we would have a case of 'selection on the observables" (see Barnow, Cain and
Goldberger, 1981).In this case, however, we have "selection on the observables and
unobservables' since X2 and ej are also inputs into admissions decisions. Nonetheless, as we have
shown, we can control for the bias due to selective admissions by controlling for the groups of
schools at which students were accepted and rejected.
The selection correction works well in this simulation because, conditional on being
9The coefficient on X1 falls because X1 and SAT are positively correlated. Since SAT is positively correlated with X,
and X is uncorrelated with X2, the coefficient on SAT is biased up, which in turn causes the coefficient on X to be
biased down. If X1 and X2 are positively correlated, however, the effect of X, could be biased upward.
'°In practice, fewer than 15 dummies were often used because some of the cells were empty. That is, in spite of the
random factor in admissions, there were no simulated students who were rejected by some combination of schools
and accepted by others.
we control for X1 and the latent variable Z = + e/4instead of the college application dummies, then the
expected coefficient on X1 still exceeds zero because the coefficient on Z is less than .5dueto idiosyncratic errors
in evaluating the candidates. The acceptlreject dummies are also imperfect measures of X1+X2, which is why X1has
a coefficient that exceeds zero in column 3.10
accepted, the average SAT score of the school students attend is uncorrelated with the students'
personal characteristics. Indeed, column 4 shows that including three dummy variables indicating
whether a student was admitted to each college has the same effect on the school SAT variable as
controlling for the 16 possible configurations of rejections and acceptances among the 4 schools.
In reality, all students do not apply to the same set of colleges, and it is probably
unreasonable to model students as randomly selecting the school they attend. A complete model of
the two-sided selection that takes place between students and colleges is beyond the scope of the
current paper, but it should be stressed that our selection correction still provides an unbiased
estimate of i3 if students' school enrollment decisions are a function of X1 or any variable outside
the model. The critical assumption is that students' enrollment decisions are uncorrelated with the
error term of equation (2) and X2. If the decision rule students use to choose the college they attend
from their set of options is related to their value of X2, then the bias in the within-matched applicant
model depends on the coefficient from a hypothetical regression of the average SAT score of the
school the student attends on X2, conditional on X1 and the accept/reject dummies. It is possible
that selection bias could be exacerbated by controlling for matched applicant effects. Griliches
(1979) makes this point in reference to twins models of earnings and education. In the current
context, however, if students apply to a fine enough range of colleges, the accept/reject dummies
would control for X2, and the within-matched applicant estimates would be unbiased even if college
choice on the part of students depended on X2. In the following simulation, we assume both
application and matriculation decisions are related to X2 Under these conditions, compared to
estimating equation (3), the proposed selection correction still yields a less biased estimate of
Wealter the previous simulation in two respects. First, we assume that the bottom 4011
percent of students (in terms of X, + X2) only apply to the two least selective schools; the other
students apply to all four schools. Second, we assume that more qualified students are more likely
to attend the most selective school from the set of schools that admitted them. To accomplish this,
we again assume that 25percentof the students choose to attend the best college that admitted
them, but for this simulation, we randomly select this 25 percent from the top half of the applicant
pooi (i.e., those students with X,+X2> 0). All of the other students (which includes the bottom 40
percent of students who applied to two schools and the next 10 percent who applied to four)
randomly choose which school to attend from the set that admitted them. Panel B provides results
from simulating such a model 100 times. Although school-average SAT has a positive effect on
earnings in all the models that omit X2, it is less than half as large when we include 17 dummies
indicating the configurations of acceptances and rejections for the students who applied to the same
set of schools.'2 Also notice that in this simulation, the effect of school-average SAT is smaller in
the model that controls for the 17 accept/reject configurations than in the model that includes 3
dummies indicating acceptance at each college.
Another factor that would be expected to influence student matriculation decisions is
financial aid. By definition, merit aid is related to the school's assessment of the student's potential.
Past studies have found that students are more likely to matriculate to schools that provide them
with more generous financial aid packages (see, e.g., van der Klaauw, 1997). If more selective
colleges provide more merit aid, the estimated effect of attending an elite college will be biased
upward because relatively more students with higher values of X2 will matriculate at elite colleges,
'2There are 2 more dummy variables in this simulation than in the previous simulation because there are two more
combinations of acceptances and rejections representing the students that apply to only two schools.12
even conditional on the outcomes of the applications to other colleges. The relationship between
aid and school selectivity is likely to be quite complicated, however. Breneman (1994; Chapter 3),
for example, finds that the middle ranked liberal arts colleges provide more financial aid than the
highest ranked and lowest ranked liberal arts colleges. If students with higher values of X2 are
more likely to attend less selective colleges because of financial aid, the selectivity bias could be
negative instead of positive.
Also notice that if students choose the college they attend based on 8,theerror in the
structural wage equation, then the selection-bias adjustment could lead to more or less biased
estimates. The bias would depend on the coefficient on SAT from a hypothetical regression of s on
SAT, X1, and the accept/reject dummies.
Finally, an alternative though related approach to modelling unobserved student selection is
to assume that students are knowledgeable about their academic potential, and reveal their potential
ability by the choice of schools they apply to. Indeed, students may have a better sense of their
potential ability than college admissions committees. To cite one prominent example, note that
Steven Spielberg was rejected by both USC and UCLA film schools (Grover, 1998). It is plausible
that students with greater observed and unobserved ability are more likely to apply to more
selective colleges. In this situation, the error term in equation (3) could be modelled as a function
of the average SAT score (denoted AVG) of the schools to which the student applied: u =+
'r1AVG+v1.If v is uncorrelated with the SAT score of the school the student attended, we can
solve the selection problem by including AVG in the wage equation. When we implement this
approach, we also include dummy variables indicating the number of schools the students applied
to. We call this approach the "self-revelation" model because individuals reveal their unobserved13
quality by their college application behavior. Notice also that the average SAT score of the schools
the student applied to, and the number of applications they submitted, would be absorbed by
including unrestricted dummies indicating students who were accepted and rejected by the same
sets of schools; therefore, the self-revelation model is a special case of our first selection correction
model.
2. Data and Comparison to Previous Literature
The College and Beyond (C&B) Survey is described in detail in Bowen and Bok (1998,
Appendix A). In short, the starting point for the C&B database was the institutional records of
students who enrolled in (but did not necessarily graduate from) one of 34 colleges in 1951, 1976
and 1989. These institutional records were linked to a survey administered by Mathematica Policy
Research, Inc. for the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation in 1995-97 and to files provided by the
College Entrance Examination Board (CEEB) and the Higher Education Research Institute (HERI)
at the University of California, Los Angeles. We focus here on the 1976 entering cohort. While
survey data are available for 23,572 students from this cohort, we exclude students from four
historically black colleges and universities, and for most of our analysis we restrict the sample to
those who were working full time. The 30 colleges and universities in our sample, as well as their
average SAT scores and tuition, are listed in Appendix Table A. Our final sample consists of
14,239 full-time, full-year workers.
The C&B institutional file consists of information drawn from students' applications and
transcripts, including variables such as students' GPA, major and SAT scores. These data were
collected for all matriculants at the C&B private schools; for the four public universities, however,14
data were collected for a subsample of students, consisting of all known minority students, all
varsity letter-winners, all students with combined SAT scores of 1,350 and above, and a random
sample of all other students. We developed weights so that the sample is nationally representative
of public and private universities and liberal arts colleges.13
The C&B institutional data were linked to files provided by HERI and CEEB. The CEEB
file contains information from the Student Descriptive Questionnaire (SDQ), which students fill out
when they take the SAT exam. We use students' responses to the SDQ to determine their high
school class rank and parental income. The file that HERI provided is based on data from a
questionnaire administered to college freshman by the Cooperative Institutional Research Program
(CIRP). We use this file to supplement C&B data on parental occupation and education.
Finally, the C&B survey data consist of the responses to a questionnaire that most
respondents completed by mail in 1996, although those who did not respond to two different
mailings were surveyed over the phone. The survey response rate was approximately 80 percent.
The survey data include information on 1995 annual earnings, occupation, demographics,
education, civic activities, and satisfaction.'4Importantly for our purposes, early in the
questionnaire respondents were asked, "In rough order of preference, please list the other schools
13We use Carnegie Classifications to define these categories. The public and private universities include all
Doctorate-Granting Institutions (Research I and II and Doctorate I and II), and the liberal arts colleges include the
Liberal Arts Colleges I.
'4The C&B survey asked respondents to report their 1995 pre-tax annual earnings in one of the following ten intervals:
less than $1,000; $1 ,000-$9,999; $1 0,000-s19,999;$20,000-$29,999; $30,000-$49,999; 550,000-74,999; 575,000-
100,000; 5100,000-5149,999; $l50,000-$199,999, and more than $200,000. We converted the lowest nine earnings
categories to a cardinal scale by assigning values equal to the midpoint of each range, and then calculated the natural
log of earnings. For workers in the topcoded category, we used the 1990 Census (after adjusting the Census data to
1995 dollars) to calculate mean log earnings for college graduates age 36-38 who earned more than $200,000 per year.15
you seriously considered."15 Respondents were then asked whether they applied to, and were
accepted by, each of the schools they listed.'6 By linking the school identifiers to a file provided by
HERI, we determined the average SAT score of each school that each student applied to. This
information enabled us to form groups of students who applied to a similar set of schools and
received the same admissions decisions (i.e., the same combination of acceptances and rejections).
Because there were so many colleges to which students applied, we considered schools equivalent
if their average SAT score fell into the same 25 point interval. For example, iftwo schools had an
average SAT score between 1200 and 1225, we assumed they used the same admissions cutoff.
Then we formed groups of students who applied to, and were accepted and rejected by,
"equivalent" schools.'7
Table 2 illustrates how we would construct 5groupsof matched applicants for 15
hypothetical students. Students A and B applied to the exact same three schools and were accepted
and rejected by the same schools, so they were paired together. The four schools to which students
C, D, and E applied were sufficiently close in terms of average SAT scores that they were
considered to use the same admission standards; because these students received the same
5Students who responded to the C&B pilot survey were not asked this question, and therefore are excluded from our
analysis.
16Students could have responded that they couldn't recall applying or being accepted, as well as yes or no. They were
asked to list three colleges other than the one they attended that they seriously considered. In addition, prior to the
question on schools the student seriously considered, respondents were asked "which school did you most want to
attend, that is, what was your first choice school?" If that school was different from the school the student attended,
there was a follow-up question that asked whether the student applied to their first-choice school, and whether they
were accepted there. Consequently, infonnation was collected on a maximum of 4 colleges to which the student could
have applied, in addition to the college the student attended.
'7Students who applied to only one school were not included in these matches.16
admissions decisions from comparable schools, they were categorized as matched applicants.
Students were not matched if they applied to only one school (students F and G), or if no other
student applied to a set of schools with similar SAT scores (student 0). Five dummy variables
would be created indicating each of the matched sets.
Table 3 provides weighted means and standard deviations for men and women in the
sample who were employed full time in 1995. Everyone in the sample attended a C&B school as a
freshman but did not necessarily graduate from the school (or from any school). Nearly 70 percent
of students in the unweighted data listed at least one other school they applied to in addition to the
school they attended, whereas just over half of the students in the weighted sample reported
applying to at least one additional school. This difference stems from the fact that students from
public universities receive much more weight in the weighted sample than unweighted sample, and
students who attended public universities were less likely to report applying to another school that
they seriously considered attending. Among students who were accepted by more than one school,
59 percent chose to attend the most selective school to which they were admitted. We were able to
match 44 percent of the students with at least one other student in the sample on the basis of the
schools that they were accepted and rejected by. Summary statistics are also reported for the
subsample of matched applicants. It is clear that the C&B sample is very selective. The mean
annual earnings in 1995 for full-time, full-year workers is $89,026 for the male sample and $76,859
for the pooled sample of men and women, both of which are high even for college graduates. The
studentsT average SAT score (Math plus Verbal) exceeds 1,100. Nearly 40 percent of the sample
was ranked in the top 10 percent of their high school class.
Because the schools included in the C&B sample are highly selective, with average SAT17
scores ranging from 1,020 to 1,360, we first compared the payoff to attending a more selective
school in the C&B sample to corresponding estimates from representative national samples of
college graduates. In Table 4 we replicate as closely as possible the wage regressions reported by
Kane (1998) and Daniel, Black and Smith (1997). Kane analyzes a pooled sample of men and
women from the High School and Beyond (HSB) Survey, whereas Daniel, et al. use a sample of
men from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). In both studies, college selectivity
is measured by the average SAT of students who attend each college, as reported by the
institution.18 These estimates indicate that attending a school with a 100 point higher average SAT
score is associated with 5to8 percent higher earnings later in life, but the estimates based on the
C&B survey are slightly higher than the corresponding estimates from the NLSY and especially the
HSB. Brewer, Eide and Ehrenberg (1999) provide evidence that the payoff to attending an elite
college increased between 1986 and 1992, which could account for the larger C&B estimates. In
the next section, we examine whether these estimates are confounded by unobserved student
attributes.
3. The Effect of College Selectivity on Earnings
Tables 5a and Sb present our main set of log-earnings regressions. We limit the sample to
full-time, full-year workers, and estimate separate Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regressions for a
t8For the C&B survey, we based school-average SAT scores on a data file provided by HERI. HERI collects SAT
score data from college guidebooks; the scores in the guidebooks are generally based on the schools' responses to
surveys. The correlation between the HERI SAT scores and the school averages calculated from the students in the
C&B database for 30 schools is .94. The mean, however, is 25 points higher in the HERI data. We use the HERI data
to be comparable with the previous literature (e.g., Kane, 1998), and because we do not have data on average SAT
scores for schools outside the C&B universe.18
pooled sample of men and women (Table 5a), and for the subset of men (Table 5b).'9 The reported
standard errors are robust to correlation in the errors among students who attended the same
college. With the exception of a dummy variable indicating whether the student participated on a
varsity athletic team, the explanatory variables are all determined prior to the time the student
entered college. Most of the covariates are fairly standard, although an explanation of the
"predicted log parental income" variable is necessary. Parental income was missing for many
individuals in the sample. Consequently, we predicted income by first regressing log parental
income on mother's and father's education and occupation for the subset of students with available
family income data (see Appendix Table 2), and then multiplying the coefficients from this
regression by the values of the explanatory variables for every student in the sample.
The basic model, reported in the first column of Tables 5a and Sb, is comparable to the
models estimated in much of the previous literature in that no attempt is made to adjust for selective
admissions. In Table 5a, the basic model indicates that students who attended a school with a 100
point higher average SAT score earned about 6 percent higher earnings in 1995, holding constant
their own SAT score, race, gender, parental income, athletic status, and high school rank. For the
sample of men in Table 5b, the basic model shows that the effect of a 100 point higher school-
average SAT score on earnings is similar, about 7 percent.
Column 2 presents the "matched applicant" model, which adjusts for selection by including
dummy variables that indicate students who were accepted and rejected by the same sets of schools.
As mentioned earlier, to form these groups we treat schools with average SAT scores in the same
25 point range as identical. We were able to match 6,335 students with at least one other student
19The sample of women was too small to draw precise estimates from, but the results were qualitatively similar.19
who applied to, and was accepted and rejected by, an equivalent set of institutions. Including
dummies for the sets of matched students renders the effect of school-average SAT
indistinguishable from zero in column 2 for both of the samples. The standard error doubles when
we look within matched sets of students, but for the pooled sample, we can reject an effect of
around 3 percent higher earnings for a 100 point increase in the school-average SAT score; that is,
we can reject an effect size that is smaller than that found in most of the previous literature. The
weaker effect of school SAT in the matched applicant models is not just a result of idiosyncracies
of the restrictive matched applicant samples; if we estimate the basic model in column 1 for the
matched applicant subsample, the results are qualitatively similar to those from the full sample.
Figure 1 illustrates the college application and attendance patterns of the most common sets
of matched applicants (i.e., those sets that include at least 15 students). The length of the bars
indicates the range of schools to which each set of matched students applied, and the shaded area of
each bar represents the range of schools that each set of students actually attended. As shown by
the figure, most students reported applying to a relatively narrow range of schools insofar as SAT
scores are concerned,2° and the range of schools that students attended is even narrower, The
average range of school-average SAT scores of students who were accepted by at least two schools
was 139 points.2' Furthermore, dummies indicating the groups of matched students account for 85
percentof the variability of in the average SAT scores of the schools the students actually attended.
201t is possible that the range of schools is particularly circumscribed because the C&B survey asked respondents to
report the schools they "seriously considered."
21This figure refers to the average range of school-SAT scores for the schools that accepted the students. The average
range of school-average SAT scores for the schools that students applied to (regardless of whether they were accepted)
was 158 for students who applied to more than one school.20
Thus, it is possible that the restricted variability used to identify the effect of school selectivity
within matched groups of students does not influence earnings, whereas an experiment that moved
students from a school with a 1,000 average SAT score to one with a 1,300 average would have a
substantial effect on students! earnings. Although the latter experiment is relevant for larger
considerations of education policy (such as affirmative action), specific instances of students who
considered attending such a wide range of schools are rare. For parents and students, however, the
relevant comparison is among the set of schools that admitted the student.
Our second model that adjusts for selection, the "self-revelation" model, is shown in column
3 of Tables 5a and 5b. This model includes the average SAT score of the schools to which students
applied, and dummy variables indicating the number of schools to which students applied. The
effect of school-average SAT score is qualitatively similar in the self-revelation and matched
applicant models. In the self-revelation model for both of the samples, the effect of school-average
SAT in colunm 3 is close to zero, and more precisely estimated than in the matched applicant
model. Results of the self-revelation models are similar to those of the matched applicant models
because students who apply to schools with the same mean SAT tend to apply to a fairly narrow
range of schools around that mean. The average SAT score of the schools students applied to
accounts for 62 percent of the variability in the SAT score of the schools students attended.
Table 6 presents parameter estimates from models that are similar to the self-revelation
model, but use alternative selection controls in place of the average SAT score of the schools to
which the student applied. For example, the third row reports estimates from a model that controls
for the average SAT score of the schools at which the student was accepted. The results of this
model are similar to those in the self-revelation model in row 2, in that the effect on earnings of the21
average SAT score of the school that the student attended is indistinguishable from zero. We also
obtain similar results when we control for the highest school-average SAT score among the
colleges that accepted the student (row 4) or the highest school-average SAT score among the
colleges to which the student applied (row 5).Moreover,we consistently find that the average SAT
score of the schools the student applied to, but either was rejected by or chose not to attend, has a
large effect on earnings. For example, results from the model in row 7 show that a 100 point
increase in the highest school-average SAT score among the colleges at which the student was
rejected is associated with an 8 percent increase in earnings. These results raise doubt about a
causal interpretation of the effect of attending a school with a higher average SAT score in
regressions that do not control for selection.
A. Results for National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class of 1972
To explore the robustness of our results in a nationally representative data set, we analyzed
data from the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS-72). We restrict
the NLS-72 sample to those students who started at a four-year college or university in October of
1972, and we use 1985 annual earnings data from the fifth follow-up survey. In 1985 the NLS-72
respondents were about six years younger than the C&B respondents were in 1995 (typically 31
versus 37). In the first follow-up survey, the NLS-72 asked students questions about other schools
to which they may have applied in a fashion similar to the C&B survey.22 The NLS-72 also
22Specifically, respondents were asked, 'When you first applied, what was the name and address of the FIRST school or
college of your choice? Were you accepted for admission at that school?" These questions were repeated for the
respondents' second and third choice schools. We matched the responses to these questions to the HERI file to
determine the average SAT score in 1973 of the schools that students applied to.22
contains detailed information about student& academic and family backgrounds, allowing us to
construct most of the same variables used in Table 5•23TheNLS-72 survey did not, however,
collect information on respondents' full-year work status in 1985. We include in the sample all
NLS-72 respondents (regardless of how much they worked) whose annual earnings exceeded
$5,000.
The means and standard deviations for the NLS-72 sample, as well as regression estimates,
are reported in Table 7. Because the NLS-72 sample is relatively small (2,127 workers), we could
not estimate the matched applicant model; however, we were able to estimate the basic regression
model and self-revelation model for a pooled sample of men and women. The basic model without
application controls, in column 2, indicates that a 100 point increase in the school-average SAT
score is associated with approximately 5.1 percent higher annual earnings. However, the self-
revelation model reported in column 3 suggests that the effect of school-average SAT score is close
to zero, although the standard error of .023 makes it difficult to draw a precise inference. The
school SAT score estimates based on the comparable C&B sample are strikingly similar: the
coefficient (standard error) on school-average SAT score was .055 (.019) in the basic model and
-.022 (.017) in the self-revelation model using the C&B sample and imposing similar sample
restrictions (in 1995 dollars). These results suggest that our findings in Tables 5a and 5b are not
unique to the schools covered by the C&B survey.
23We have parental income data for most of the NLS-72 sample, allowing us to control for actual, rather than predicted,
parental income. We do not include a dummy variable for athletes because NLS-72 does not identify varsity letter
winners.23
B. Interactions Between School-Average SAT and Student Characteristics
Table 8 reports another set of estimates of the three models using the C&B data set (basic,
matched applicant, and self-revelation model) augmented to include an interaction between school-
average SAT and predicted log parental income. For the pooled sample of men and women, in all
the models we estimated the coefficient on the interaction between parental income and school-
average SAT is negative, indicating a higher payoff to attending a more selective college for
children from lower income households. The interaction term is statistically significant and
generally has a sizable magnitude. For example, based on the self-revelation model in column 3of
Table 8, the gain from attending a college with a 200 point higher average SAT score for a family
whose predicted log income is two standard deviations below the mean is 7 percent, versus
virtually nil for a family with mean income.
In results not reported here, we also experimented with adding a variable to each model in
Table 5a that interacted the students' own SAT score and the average SAT score of the school they
attended. These estimates uniformly yielded significant negative effects on the own SAT-school
SAT interaction term. Moreover, if we further allow for an asymmetric effect of the own SAT-
school SAT interaction for students whose SAT scores exceeded the school average (i.e., by also
including the product of a dummy variable indicating students whose SAT score exceeded their
school average and the interaction between school and own SAT), we continue to fmd negative
effects of the interactions between own SAT and school SAT. Thus, there is no evidence in these
data that students who score relatively low on the SAT exam do worse in the labor market by
attending schools with a relatively high average SAT.24
C. The Effect of Other College Characteristics on Earnings
Although the average SAT score of the school a student attends does not have a robust
effect on earnings once selection on unobservables is taken into account, we do find that the school
a student attends is systematically related to his or her subsequent earnings. In particular, if we
include 30 unrestricted dummy variables indicating school of attendance instead of theaverage
SAT score in each of the models in Tables 5a and 5b, we reject the null hypothesis that schools are
unrelated to earnings at the .01 level. Thus, something about schools appears to influence earnings.
A possible reason for the insignificance of school-average SAT in the selection-adjusted models is
that the average SAT score is a crude measure of the quality of one's peer group. Since, to some
extent, all schools enroll a heterogeneous group of students, it might be possible for students to seek
out the type of peer group they desire if they had attended any of the schools that admitted them.
An able student who attends a lower tier school can find able students to study with, and, alas, a
weak student who attends an elite school can find many other weak students to not study with. Our
within-group models may place too much emphasis on an imperfect measure of school selectivity.
Therefore, we next examine the effect of other college characteristics on students' subsequent
earnings. First, we explore the effect on earnings of the dispersion in SAT scores within a school.
Then we examine the return to the schools' average tuition costs (net of financial aid) and to their
expenditures per student.
For each school in the C&B data set, we calculated the standard deviation of SAT scores
among freshmen in 1976. The standard deviation of within-school SAT scores ranged from 118 to
170 across schools, and the average standard deviation was 150 points. Across these colleges, the
correlation between the average SAT score and standard deviation of scores is -.39, which is25
consistent with less selective schools imposing a lower admissions threshold and attracting a more
diverse student body in terms of achievement levels. We estimated a series of regressions in which
we included the school-average SAT score, cross-sectional standard deviation of scores, and
interaction between these two variables, in addition to the other variables in Table 5. The pattern of
results was similar for the three models we estimated. The estimated coefficients and standard
errors from the self-revelation model for the pooled sample of men and women are reported below
(4) In W =.77SAT + 6.10 SD -.53SAT*SD+ other variables
(.44) (3.49) (.30)
where SAT is the school-average SAT (divided by 100), SD is the school standard deviation of
SAT scores (divided by 100) and SAT*SD is the product of these two variables. Interestingly, each
of the variables is on the margin of being individually statistically significant. The mean and
dispersion of SAT scores among students in a college have a complex relationship with student
earnings. A higher school-average SAT score is negatively associated with earnings for a college
with dispersion in SAT scores greater than or equal to the average standard deviation of scores for
this sample of 30 colleges. For the top two-thirds of the schools in our sample in terms of average
SAT scores, greater dispersion in SAT scores is negatively associated with earnings.24
Table 9 presents models in which the logarithm of college tuition costs net of average
student aid is the school quality indicator.25 For the pooled sample of men and women, these
models indicate that students who attend higher tuition schools earn more after entering the labor
24This result is consistent with Hoxby and Terry (1998), although they do not present results controlling for
selection on unobserved student characteristics.
25Net tuition for 1970 and 1980 was calculated by subtracting the average aid awarded to undergraduates from the
sticker price tuition, as reported in the 11thand12" editions of American Universities and Colleges. Then the 1976
net tuition was interpolated from the 1970 and 1980 net tuition, assuming an exponential rate of growth.26
market. The magnitude of the coefficient on tuition falls in the models that adjust for school
selection, but remains sizable. For example, the coefficient of .050 in column 5impliesan internal
real rate of return of approximately 16 percent for a person who begins work after attending college
for four years, then earns mean 1995 income throughout his career and retires 44 years later.26 The
coefficient in column 3 implies an internal real rate of return of 18 percent. Notice also that the
coefficient on the interaction term for parental income and tuition (shown in columns 2, 4, and 6) is
negative, indicating that there is a higher payoff to attending a more expensive school for children
from low-income families. Although the implied internal rates of return to investing in a more
expensive college in Table 9 are extremely high, one should recognize that the cost of education has
roughly doubled in real terms since the late 1 970s, and the payoff to education increased in general
since the late 1 970s. The implicit internal real rate of return for the estimate in column 5 of Table 9
falls to 9 percent if tuition costs are doubled. Indeed, the supernormal return to investing in high-
tuition education in the 1 970s may explain why it was possible for colleges to raise tuition so much
inthe 1980s and 1990s.
College tuition may have a significant effect on subsequent earnings because schools with
higher tuition may provide their students with more, or higher quality, resources. We next
summarize estimates of the effect of expenditures per student on subsequent earnings. Interestingly,
the correlation between tuition and total expenditures per student in our sample of schools is less
than .30, so differences in tuition probably result from factors in addition to spending per student,
such as the value of the schooPs endowment and public support. One should also recognize
26This rate of return would fall to 14 percent if we assumed that the person spent 1.5 years in graduate school (the
average time spent in graduate school for the C&B sample) immediately after college.27
limitations of our measures of expenditures per students: (1) undergraduate and graduate student
expenditures are combined; (2) there are inherent difficulties classifying instructional and non-
instructional spending; and (3) expenditures are lumpy over time.
To directly explore the effect of school spending, we included either the log of total
expenditures per student (undergraduate and graduate), or the log of instructional expenditures per
student, in place of tuition in the earnings equation.27 Both measures of expenditures per pupil had
a statistically significant and large impact on earnings in the basic model for the pooled sample of
men and women. When we estimated the matched applicant model and the self-revelation model,
the effect of expenditures per pupil was smaller, and less precisely estimated. Although the effect
of expenditures per pupil was statistically insignificant, the coefficient was positive in all but one of
the models, and implied substantial internal rates of return to school spending.28 These results
provide mixed evidence on the effect of expenditures per student on students' subsequent income,
perhaps because spending per student is poorly measured.
D. Estimates for Black Students
Because of interest in the effect of affirmative action in admissions by more selective
schools, we have estimated all the preceding models separately for black students using the C&B
data set. Unfortunately, the sample of black students who enrolled in these schools in 1976 is
relatively small --only839 full-time workers.Consequently, our results are imprecise.
27We use 1976 expenditure data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) Survey.
28The coefficient (and standard error) on log instructional expenditures per student if this variable wasincludedinstead
of tuition in column 1, 3 and 5 of Table 9 were: .096 (.047); .073 (.082); and .036 (.045). The corresponding
coefficients for log total expenditures per student were: .110 (.066); -.009 (.088); and .041 (.068).28
Nonetheless, there is no evidence that the relationship between school selectivity and subsequent
earnings is different for black students. For example, when we estimate the model in column 1 of
Table 5a for black students, the coefficient (and standard error) on school-average SAT is .060
(.025). The coefficient falls to .024 (.030) if the self-revelation model in column 3 is estimated.
Similar to all students, black students who attended higher tuition schools had higher earnings when
they joined the labor market, and the magnitudes on the coefficients were comparable to the
estimates for the full sample. In general, these data suggest that black students benefit from
attending more selective colleges just as much as other students, but we cannot draw a strong
inference because of the small number of black students in our sample in 1976.
4. Academic Outcomes
Finally, we examined the relationship between school selectivity and three academic
outcomes: the students' college grade point average (GPA), probability of graduating from the
college they first attended, and probability of obtaining a post-college degree Because of
differences in grading schemes and generosity across schools, we measure grades within colleges,
by the students' GPA percentile rank in their class. For each outcome, we estimated a linear
probability model for each of our three classes of models using the pooled sample of men and
women. Results are reported in Table 10.
In all three classes of models, students who attended a college with a higher average SAT
score tended to have a lower rank in the class, other things equal.29 For example, according to the
29Bowen and Bok (1998) report a similarresult.29
basic model, students who attended a college with a 100 point higher average SAT score tended to
graduate 5.6percentileranks lower in their class. The corresponding deficit was 7.8 percentile
ranks in the matched applicant model and 6.4 percentile ranks in the self-revelation model. The
improvement in class rank for students who choose to attend a less selective college may help
explain why those students do not appear to incur lower earnings; employers (and graduate schools)
may value their higher class rank by enough to offset any other effect of attending a less selective
college on earnings. If we add class rank to the wage regressions in Table 5a, we find that students
who graduate 7 percentile ranks higher in their class earn about 3.2 percent higher earnings, which
may largely offset any advantage of attending an elite college on earnings.
Lastly, Table 10 provides mixed evidence for the effect of school-average SAT on
graduation rates and advanced degrees. The effect of school-average SAT score on graduation rates
is indistinguishable from zero in all three models. On the other hand, school-average SAT score
has a positive and significant effect on the probability of obtaining an advanced degree in both the
basic model and the self-revelation model; however, the effect is statistically insignificant in the
matched applicant model.
5. Conclusion
The colleges that students attend are affected by selection on the part of the schools that
students apply to, and by selection on the part of the students and their families from the menu of
feasible options. A major concern with past estimates of the payoff to attending an elite college is
that more selective schools tend to accept students with higher earnings capacity. This paper
adjusts for selection on the part of schools by comparing earnings and other outcomes among30
students who applied to, and were accepted and rejected by, acomparableset of institutions.
Although our selection correction has many desirable features, a complete analysis of school
selection also would model students' choice of colleges. Nonetheless, since college admission
decisions are made by professional administrators who have much more information at their
disposal than researchers who later analyze student outcomes, we suspect that our selection
correction addresses a major cause of bias in past wage equations.
After we adjust for students' unobserved characteristics, our fmdings cast doubt on the view
that school selectivity, as measured by the average SAT score of the freshmen who attenda college,
is an important determinant of students' subsequent incomes. Students who attendedmore selective
colleges do not earn more than other students who were accepted and rejected by comparable
schools but attended less selective colleges. Additional evidence of omitted variable bias due to the
college application and admissions process comes from the fact that the average SAT score of
schools that a student applied to but was rejected from has a stronger effect on the student's
subsequent earnings than the average SAT score of the school the student actually attended. These
results are consistent with the conclusion of Hunt's (1963; p. 56)seminalresearch:
The C student from Princeton earns more than the A student from Podunk not mainly
because he has the prestige of a Princeton degree, but merely because he is abler. The
golden touch is possessed not by the Ivy League College, but by its students.
Even after adjusting for selection, however, we do find that the school a student attends
affects his or her subsequent income. The characteristics of schools that influence students'
subsequent income appear to be better captured by average tuition costs than by the school's
average SAT score. Indeed, we find that students who attend colleges with higher average tuition
costs tend to earn higher income years later. The internal real rate of return on college tuition for31
students who attended college in the late 1 970s was quite high, in the neighborhood of 16to 18
percent. But college tuition costs have risen considerably since the 1 970s, driving the internal rate
of return to a more normal level.
Finally, we find that the returns to school characteristics such as average SAT score or
tuition are greatest for students from more disadvantaged backgrounds. School admissions and
financial aid policies that have as a goal attracting qualified students frommore disadvantaged
family backgrounds may raise national income, as these students appear to benefit most from
attending a more elite college. Eliwood and Kane's (1998) recent finding that college enrollment
hardly increased for children from low-income families in the 1980s is troubling in this regard.32
References
American Council on Education, American Universities and Colleges, 12thedition(Hawthorn, New
York: Walter de Gruyter, 1983).
Barron's, 1982, Barron's Profiles of American Colleges (Woodbury, NY: Barron's Educational
Series, 12th edition).
Bamow, Burt S., Glen G. Cain and Arthur Goldberger, "Selection on Observables," Evaluation
Studies Review Annual, 5:43-59, 1981.
Behrman, Jere R., Jill Constantine, Lori Kletzer, Michael McPherson, and Morton 0. Schapiro,
"The Impact of College Quality on Wages: Are There Differences Among Demographic Groups?"
Working Paper No. DP-38, William College, 1996.
Behrman, Jere R., Mark R. Rosenzweig and Paul Taubman, "College Choice and Wages: Estimates
Using Data on Female Twins," Review of Economics and Statistics, 78 (4), 1996, pp. 672-85.
Bowen, William G., and Derek Bok, The Shape of the River: Long-Term Consequences of
Considering Race in College and University Admissions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1998).
Braun, Henry and Ted Szatrowski, "The Scale-Linkage Algorithm: Construction of a Universal
Criterion Scale for Families of Institutions," Journal of Educational Statistics 9, 1984, pp. 311-330.
Breneman, David W. Liberal Arts Colleges: Thriving, Surviving or Endangered (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994).
Brewer, Dominic and Ronald Ehrenberg, "Does it Pay to Attend an Elite Private College? Evidence
from the Senior High School Class of 1980" in Research in Labor Economics, vol. 15, pp. 239-71.
Brewer, Dominic, Eric Eide and Ronald Ehrenberg, "Does it Pay to Attend an Elite College? Cross
Cohort Evidence on the Effects of College Type on Earnings," Journal of Human Resources 34 (1),
Winter 1999, pp. 104-23.
Daniel, Kermit, Dan Black, and Jeffrey Smith, "College Quality and the Wages of Young Men,"
Research Report No. 9707, Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, 1997.
Ellwood, David and Thomas Kane, "Who is Getting a College Education: Family Background and
the Growing Gaps in Enrollment," Mimeo., Kennedy School of Government, September 1998.
Fumiss, Todd W., ed. American Universities and Colleges ,11thedition(Washington D.C.:
American Council on Education, 1973).33
Griliches, Zvi, "Sibling Models and Data in Economics: Beginnings of a Survey," Journal of
Political Economy, 87 (5), 1979, pp. S37-S64.
Grover, Ronald, "How Steven Spielberg Sustains His Creative Empire," Business Week, July 13,
1998, p. 96.
Heckman, James, "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," Econometrica 47 (1), 1979, pp.
153-6 1.
Hoxby, Caroline, and Bridget Terry, "Explaining Rising Income and Wage Inequality Among the
College-Educated," Mimeo., Harvard University, April, 1999.
Hunt, Shane, "Income Determinants for College Graduates and the Return to Educational
Investment." Unpublished Ph.D. Disseration, Yale University, 1963.
Kane, Thomas, "Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College Admission," in The Black-White Test
Score Gap, edited by C. Jencks and M. Phillips, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998.
National Association for College Admission Counseling, "Survey Examines Trends," the NACAC
Bulletin, November, 1998, p. 1.
Solmon, Lewis, "The Definition of College Quality," in Does College Matter: Some Evidence on
the Impacts of Higher Education, edited by Lewis Solmon and Paul Taubman (New York:
Academic Press, 1973).
Solmon, Lewis, and Paul Wachtel, "The Effects on Income of Type of College Attended,"
Sociology of Education 48, 1975, pp. 75-90.
U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education
Statistics 1997, NCES 98-015, Washington, D.C., 1997.
Van der Klaauw, Wilbert, "A Regression-Discontinuity Evaluation of the Effect of Financial Aid
Offers on College Enrollment," Mimeo., Department of Economics, NYU, October 1997.
Wales, Terence, "The Effect of College Quality on Earnings: Results from the NBER-Thorndike
Data," Journal of Human Resources 8, 1973, pp. 306-17.
Winston, Gordon, and Ivan Yen, "Costs, Prices, Subsidies, and Aid in U.S. Higher Education,"
Working Paper DP-32, Williams College, July, 1995.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Average Regression Statistics from Simulating Selection Correction Model 100 Times
Panel A: All Students Apply to Four Schools; Random Matriculation







(1) (2) (3) Variable
Intercept
School Average SATJ*




































Panel B: Bottom 40 Percent of Students Apply to Two Schools; Matriculation at Best School






























X2(e.g., unobserved ability) 0.50
(0.02)
-- -- --
17 dummies for College Acceptance
and Rejection Configurations1
No No Yes No
3 dummies indicating
College Acceptance
No No No Yes
R2 0.33 0.25 0.27 0.26
Notes:
1. Actual number of dummies is usually fewer because of empty cells.
2. Each simulated sample had 4,000 observations. See text for further details.
The standard deviation of each estimated coefficient is in parentheses.Table 2
Illustrationof How Matched Applicant Groups Were Constructed
Student Applications to College
Application 1 Application 2 Application 3 Application 4
Matched SchoolSchool SchoolSchool SchoolSchool School School
ApplicantAverage Admissions Average Admissions Average Admissions Average Admissions
StudentGroup SATDecision SATDecision SATDecision SAT Decision
StudentA 1 1280 Reject 1226 Accept* 1215Accept na na
Student B 1 1280 Reject 1226Accept 1215Accept* na na
Student C 2 1360 Accept 1310 Reject 1270Accept* 1155 Accept
Student D 2 1355 Accept 1316 Reject 1270Accept* 1160 Accept
Student E 2 1370 Accept* 1316 Reject 1260 Accept 1150 Accept
Student F Excluded1180 Accept* na na na na na na
Student G Excluded1180 Accept* na na na na na na
Student H 3 1360 Accept 1308 Accept* 1260 Accept 1160 Accept
Student I 3 1370 Accept* 1311 Accept 1255 Accept 1155 Accept
StudentJ 3 1350 Accept 1316 Accept* 1265 Accept 1155 Accept
Student K 4 1245 Reject 1217 Reject 1180 Accept* na na
Student L 4 1235 Reject 1209 Reject 1180 Accept* na na
StudentM 5 1140 Accept 1055 Accept* na na na na
StudentN 5 1145Accept* 1060Accept na na na na
Student 0 No Match1370 Reject 1038 Accept* na na na na
*Denotes school attended
na=did not report submitting application
Notes: The data shown on this table represent hypothetical students. Students F and G would be excluded from the
matched applicant subsample because they only applied to one school (the school they attended). Student 0















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Comparison of Estimates from C&B to Estimates from National Samples
ParameterEstimates




(Kane) C&B (Daniel, et al.)
2 3 4
School-Average SAT Score/I 00 0.069 0.056 0.087 0.061
(0.018) (0.010) (0.021) (0.013)




Black or Hispanic 0.076 -0.006
(0.017) (0.025)
Years of Father's Education 0.004
(0.003)
Years of Mother's Education -0.002
(0.004)
Parental Income (10K) 0.054
(0.008)
Parental Income Missing 0.150
(0.016)
High School Top Ten 0.09 1
(0.012)
High School Rank Missing -0.002
(0.044)
Any Post-Secondary Schooling **
N 17,213 3,686 9,106 3,100
*This regression includes controls for parental education, family income, gender, student SAT,
and high school grade point average: however, the coefficients are not reported in Kane (1998).
**This regression includes controls for student ability (age-adjusted ASVAB scores), and a dummy
indicating whether the respondent had any post-secondary schooling: however, the coefficients are
not reported in Daniel, et al. (1997).
Notes: All equations also include constant terms. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The C&B model in column 1 includes all survey respondents, except those who earned less than
$1,000. The HSB regression in column 2 excludes those who earned less than $1,000
or more than $100,000 in 1991. The C&B model in column 3 and the NLSY model
in column 4 include all male workers, regardless of whether they worked full-time.
C&B estimates are weighted using sample weights, and the reported standard errors are robust
to correlated errors among students who attended the same institution.Table 5a
Log Earnings Regressions for C&B Pooled Sample of Male and Female Full-Time Workers
Parameter Estimates
Basic Model: Matched Self-
No SelectionApplicant Revelation
Controls Model Model
Variable 1 2 3
School-Average SAT Score/i 00 0.060 -0.025 -0.009
(0.016) (0.028) (0.019)
Predicted Log(Parerital Income) 0.201 0.194 0.180
(0.020) (0.026) (0.021)
Own SAT Score/i 00 0.028 -0.004 0.020
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Female -0.396 -0.417 -0.389
(0.015) (0.025) (0.014)
Black 0.020 -0.023 0.009
(0.029) (0.053) (0.030)
Hispanic 0.011 -0.106 0.006
(0.041) (0.118) (0.045)
Asian 0.212 0.280 0.193
(0.035) (0.070) (0.036)
Other/Missing Race -0.198 0.202 -0.204
(0.148) (0.211) (0.145)
High School Top Ten Percent 0.055 0.093 0.057
(0.023) (0.022) (0.024)
High School Rank Missing 0.000 0.036 -0.010
(0.038) (0.060) (0.035)
Athlete 0.111 0.138 0.103
(0.025) (0.048) (0.022)
Average SAT Score/i 00 of Schools Applied To 0.079
(0.016)
One Additional Application 0.055
(0.009)
Two Additional Applications 0.066
(0.026)
Three Additional Applications 0.096
(0.039)
Four Additional Applications 0.093
(0.042)
AdjustedRSquared 0.110 0.144 0.115
N 14,239 6,335 14,239
Notes: Each equation also includes a constant tern,. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are
are robust to correlated errors among students who attended the same institution.
Equations are estimated by WLS.
*Applicants are matched by the average SAT score (within 25 point intervals) of each school at which they were
accepted or rejected. This model includes 1232 dummy variables representing each set of matched applicants.Table 5b
Log Earnings Regression for Male Full-Time Workers, C&B Sample
Parameter Estimates
Basic Model: Matched Self-
No Selection Applicant Revelation
Controls ModeI Model
Variable 1 2 3
School-Average SAT Score/i 00 0.071 -0.002 -0.004
(0.020) (0.044) (0.025)
Predicted Log(Parental Income) 0.241 0.176 0.217
(0.031) (0.067) (0.030)
Own SAT Score/i 00 0.026 -0.010 0.016
(0.007) (0.020) (0.006)
Black -0.099 -0.183 -0.112
(0.040) (0.087) (0.039)
Hispanic -0.004 -0.170 -0.004
(0.043) (0.157) (0.041)
Asian 0.126 0.239 0.105
(0.059) (0.085) (0.060)
Other/Missing Race -0.195 0.450 -0.208
(0.271) (0.373) (0.267)
High School Top Ten Percent 0.016 0.077 0.020
(0.021) (0.035) (0.023)
High School Rank Missing -0.025 0.013 -0.035
(0.027) (0.061) (0.024)
Athlete 0.107 0.111 0.094
(0.027) (0.037) (0.024)
Average SAT Score/i 00 of Schools Applied To 0.088
(0.023)
One Additional Application 0.061
(0.015)
Two Additional Applications 0.043
(0.019)
Three Additional Applications 0.119
(0.030)
Four Additional Applications 0.060
(0.034)
Adjusted R Squared 0.043 0.094 0.051
N 8,674 3,544 8,674
Notes: Each equation also includes a constant term. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are
are robust to correlated errors among students who attended the same institution.
Equations are estimated by WLS.
*Applicants are matched by the average SAT score (within 25 point intervals) of each school at which they were
accepted or rejected. This model includes 770 dummy variables representing each set of matched applicants.Table 6
The Effect of School-Average SAT Score on Earnings in Models that Use Alternative
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Notes: Each model also includes the same control variables as the Self-Revelation Model shown
in column 3 of Table 5a. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to correlated
errors among students who attended the same institution. Equations are estimated by WLS.
The first data column presents the coefficient on the average SAT score at the school the student
attended; the second data column presents the coefficient on the selection control described in
the left margin of the table.Table 7
Means, Standard Deviations, and Log Earnings Regressions for NLS-72 Pooled Sample of Male and Female Workers
Parameter Estimates
Variable Means Basic Model: Self-Revelation
[Standard Deviation] No Selection Controls Model
Variable Name 1 2 3
School-Average SAT Score/I 00 9.943 0.051 0.013
[1.181] (0.010) (0.023)
Log(Parental Income) 9.455 0.081 0.074
[0.615] (0.018) (0.018)
Own SAT Score/I 00 9.755 0.022 0.020
[2.057] (0.006) (0.006)
Female 0.398 -0.384 -0.384
[0.489] (0.022) (0.022)
Black 0.060 0.065 0.053
[0.238] (0.047) (0.047)
Hispanic 0.016 0.096 0.085
[0.124] (0.084) (0.084)
Asian 0.010 -0.175 -0.167
[0.099] (0.103) (0.103)
Other/Missing Race 0.023 -0.525 -0.503
[0.151] (0.069) (0.069)
High School Top Ten Percent 0.201 0.055 0.063
[0.401] (0.029) (0.030)
High School Rank Missing 0.193 0.039 0.040
[0.394] (0.027) (0.027)
Average SAT Score/i 00 of Schools Applied To 9.996 0.034
[1.114] (0.025)
One Additional Application 0.246 0.026
[0.4311 (0.025)
Two Additional Applications 0.202 0.107
[0.402] (0.028)
Three Additional Applications 0.008 0.010
[0.089] (0.115)
Adjusted R Squared --- 0.199 0.205
N 2127 2127 2,127
Notes: Each equation also includes a constant term. Standard errors are in parentheses. Equations are estimated by WLS.
All respondents who earned over $5000 in 1985 are included, regardless of full-time work status.
The mean of the dependent variable is 10.087, and the standard deviation is .525.Table 8
Log Earnings Regression Allowing the Effect of School-Average SAT to Vary with Parental Income,
C&B Pooled Sample of Male and Female Full-Time Workers
Parameter Estimates
Basic Model: Matched Self-
No Selection Applicant Revelation
Controls Model* Model
Variable 1 2 3
School-Average SAT Score/i 00 0.660 0.654 0.573
(0.226) (0.256) (0.230)
Predicted Log(Parental Income) 0.871 0.964 0.830
(0.255) (0.278) (0.258)
Predicted Log of Parental lncome*School SAT Score/i 00 -0.060 -0.068 -0.058
(0.023) (0.026) (0.023)
Own SAT ScoreIlOO 0.029 -0.004 0.021
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Female -0.395 -0.416 -0.388
(0.014) (0.025) (0.013)
Black 0.017 -0.027 0.006
(0.030) (0.052) (0.030)
Hispanic -0.001 -0.115 -0.005
(0.042) (0.118) (0.046)
Asian 0.209 0.279 0.190
(0.034) (0.071) (0.036)
Other/Missing Race -0.198 0.196 -0.203
(0.147) (0.210) (0.144)
High School Top Ten Percent 0.055 0.094 0.058
(0.024) (0.022) (0.024)
High School Rank Missing 0.003 0.039 -0.006
(0.038) (0.061) (0.035)
Athlete 0.113 0.139 0.105
(0.024) (0.048) (0.022)
Average SAT Score/i 00 of Schools Applied To 0.079
(0.016)
One Additional Application 0.055
(0.009)
Two Additional Applications 0.065
(0.026)
Three Additional Applications 0.095
(0.039)
Four Additional Applications 0.094
(0.041)
Adjusted RSquared 0.109 0.146 0.114
N 14,239 6,335 14,239
Notes: Each equation also includes a constant term. Standard errors are in parentheses, and
are robust to correlated errors among students who attended the same institution. Equations are
estimated by WLS.
*Applicants are matched by the average SAT score (within 25 point intervals) of each school at which they were
accepted or rejected. This model includes 1,232 dummy variables representing each set of matched applicants.Table 9
Log Earnings Regressions using Net Tuition as School Quality Indicator, C&B Pooled Sample of Male and
Female Full-Time Workers
Parameter Estimates







Log(NetTuition) 0.100 0.722 0.059 1.021 0.050 0.792
(0.016) (0.322) (0.031) (0.409) (0.019)(0.319)
Predicted Log(Parental Income) 0.192 0.646 0.190 0.902 0.176 0.718
(0.020) (0.242) (0.025) (0.317) (0.021)(0.247)
Log(Net Tuition)*Predicted Log (Parental Income) -0.062 -0.097 -0.075
(0.033) (0.043) (0.033)
Own SAT Score/i 00 0.029 0.029 -0.005 -0.005 0.019 0.019
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)(0.005)
Female -0.392 -0.390 -0.417 -0.416 -0.392-0.390
(0.013) (0.013) (0.024) (0.024) (0.014)(0.014)
Black 0.030 0.031 -0.025 -0.029 0.004 0.004
(0.027) (0.028) (0.052) (0.052) (0.028)(0.029)
Hispanic 0.005 -0.001 -0.117 -0.127 -0.010-0.018
(0.039) (0.040) (0.116) (0.117) (0.045)(0.046)
Asian 0.206 0.204 0.275 0.274 0.186 0.184
(0.031) (0.031) (0.070) (0.070) (0.035)(0.036)
Other/Missing Race -0.188 -0.187 0.212 0.206 -0.202 -0.201
(0.147) (0.147) (0.210) (0.209) (0.147)(0.147)
High School lop Ten Percent 0.067 0.068 0.098 0.100 0.062 0.063
(0.027) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021) (0.027)(0.027)
High School Rank Missing -0.002 -0.001 0.041 0.044 -0.008-0.006
(0.035) (0.035) (0.060) (0.060) (0.035)(0.034)
Athlete 0.114 0.115 0.137' 0.136 0.097 0.098
(0.025) (0.024) (0.048) (0.048) (0.022)(0.022)
Average SAT Score/i 00 of Schools Applied To 0.053 0.055
(0.010)(0.010)
One Additional Application 0.047 0.046
(0.008)(0.007)
Two Additional Applications 0.052 0.052
(0.024)(0.024)
Three Additional Applications 0.082 0.082
(0.036)(0.036)
Four Additional Applications 0.082 0.084
(0.044)(0.043)
AdjustedRSquared 0.112 0.112 0.146 0.147 0.115 0.115
N 14,239 14,239 6,335 6,335 14,23914,239
Notes: Each equation also includes a constant term. Standard errors are in parentheses, and
are robust to correlated errors among students who attended the same institution.
Equations are estimated by WLS. Net tuition is average tuition minus average aid (see text).
*Applicants are matched by the average SAT score (within 25 point intervals) of each school at which they were
accepted or rejected. This model includes 1,232 dummy variables representing each set of matched applicants.Table 10
Linear Probability Models for Class Rank, Graduation Probability, and Advance Degree Attainment; C&B Pooled Sample of Men and Women
Dependent Vanable
Percentile Rank in Class Graduation (1 =yes; 0=no) Advanced Degree (1 ye5. 0=no)
Basic Model:Matched Self- Basic Model:Matched Self- Basic Model: Matched Self-
No SelectionApplicantRevelation No SelectionApplicantRevelationNo Selection ApplicantRevelation
Controls
Variable 1
Modet Model Controls ModeF Model Controls Model Model
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
School-Average SAT Score/ISO -5.636 -7.825 -6.404 0.002 -0.016 0.007 0.069 -0.002 0.035
(0.661) (0.636) (0.923) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011)
Predicted Log(Parental Income) 4.566 2.677 4.689 0.046 0.040 0.048 0.126 0.086 0.117
(1.333) (0.946) (1.156) (0.008) (0.018) (0.009) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021)
Own SAT Score/100 5.914 5.958 5.841 0.024 0.026 0.025 0.052 0.051 0.048
(0.375) (0,517) (0.391) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Female 7.795 8.616 7.735 0.000 -0.007 -0.001 -0.067 -0.067 -0.064
(0.705) (1.138) (0.702) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Blach -11.375 -12.571 -11.359 -0.009 0.034 -0.008 0.131 0.127 0.126
(1.649) (1.867) (1.650) (0.021) (0.038)(0.021) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027)
Hispanic -3.510 -6,388 -3.527 -0.067 -0.111 -0.068 0.106 0.077 0,103
(3.395) (3.749) (3.223) (0.031) (0.076)(0.031) (0,054) (0.062) (0.055)
Asian• -0.054 -3.309 -0,108 . 0.027 0.027 0.028 0,087 0.137 0.079
(2.770) (1.861) (2.661) (0.017) (0.029) (0.017) (0.026) (0.053) (0.024)
Other/Missing Race -10.957 -10.525 -11.216 -0.193 -0.177 -0.192 -0.062 -0.229 -0.064
(2.148) (2.801) (2.175) (0.074) (0.151)(0.073) (0.031) (0.047) (0.032)
High School Top Ten Percent 9.566 9.753 9.322 0.050 0.028 0.051 0.072 0.064 0071
(1.343) (1.637) (1.382) (0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.017) (0.031> (0.018)
High School Rank Missing 3.711 3.262 3.655 0,045 0.015 0.047 0.018 0.019 0.014
(0.912) (1.059) (0.927) (0.016) (0.017)(0.015) (0.017) (0.029) (0.019)
Athlete -1.293 -1.592 -1.103 0.063 0.022 0.063 0.006 0.008 0.004
(0.818) (1.798) (0.867) (0.014> (0.012)(0.013) (0.019) (0.029) (0.019)
Average SAT Score/lOU of Schools Applied To 1,681 -0.007 0.043
(0.841) (0.005) (0.012)
One Additional Application 0.052 0.015 0.018
(0.640) (0.012) (0.011)
Two Additional Applications -1.436 0.015 0.034
(0.843) (0.009) (0.013)
Three Additional Applications -4,009 0.006 0.013
(0.863) (0.015> (0.020)
Four Additional Applications -7,507 -0.064 -0.002
(1.344) (0.022) (0.020)
Adjusted R Squared 0.181 0.232 0.185 0.023 0.099 0.024 0.087 0.120 0.089
N . 19,062 9,042 19,062 19,505 9.207 19,505 19.505 9,207 19,505
Notes: Sample includes all survey respondents, regardless of full-time work status. The percentile rank in class regression excludes those who were missing grade
point averages. The graduation regression counts as graduates only those students who graduated from the same C&B school at which they first matriculated.
Each equation also includes a constant term. Standard enore are in parentheses, and are robust to correlated errors among students who
attended the same institution. Equations are estimated by WLS.
Applicants are matched by the average SAT score (within 25 point intervals> of each school at which they were
accepted or rejected. This model indudes 1.566 dummy variables representing each set of matched applicants.Appendix Table I
School-Average SAT Score and Net Tuition of C&B Institutions
School-Average 1976
Institution SAT Score in 1978 Net Tuition ($)
Barnard College 1210 3530
Bryn Mawr College 1370 3171
Columbia University 1330 3591
Denison University 1020 3254
Duke University 1226 3052
Emory University 1150 3237
Georgetown University 1225 3304
Hamilton College 1246 3529
Kenyon College 1155 3329
Miami University (Ohio) 1073 1304
Northwestern University 1240 3676
Oberlin College 1227 3441
Pennsylvania State University 1038 1062
Princeton University 1308 3613
Rice University 1316 1753
Smith College 1210 3539
Stanford University 1270 3658
Swarthmore College 1340 3122
Tufts University 1200 3853
Tulane University 1080 3269
University of Michigan (Ann Arbor) 1110 1517
University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) 1080 541
University of Notre Dame 1200 3216
University of Pennsylvania 1280 3266
Vanderbilt University 1162 3155
Washington University 1180 3245
Wellesley College 1220 3312
Wesleyan University 1260 3368
Williams College 1255 3541
Yale University 1360 3744
Notes: The school-average SAT scores were obtained from HERI, and pertain to freshmen.
Net tuition for 1970 and 1980 was calculated by subtracting the average aid awarded
to undergraduates from the sticker price tuition, as reported in the 11th and 12th editions
editions of American Universities and Colleges. The 1976 net tuition was interpolated
from the 1970 and 1980 net tuition, assuming an exponential rate of growth.Appendix Table 2
Regression Predicting the Natural Log of Parental Income, C&B Sample
Parameter Standard
Variable Estimate Error
Years of Father's Education 0.067 0.003
Years of Mothers Education 0.031 0.003
Mothers Education Missing 0.550 0.096
Fathers Education Missing 0.915 0.085
Fathers Occupation Missing*Fathers Education 0.015 0.004
Mothers Occupation MissingMother's Education 0.007 0.005
Father Clerical Occupation 0.567 0.097
Father Management Consultant 0.678 0.168
Father Sales 0.669 0.044
Father Social Work 0.563 0.283
Father Communications 0.790 0.129
Father Policeman 0.503 0.182
Father Financial Services 0.813 0.048
Father Engineer 0.808 0.042
Father Computer Occupation 0.564 0.154
Father Physician 0.839 0.047
Father Religious Worker 0.132 0.069
Father Social Sciences 0.695 0.096
Father Primary or Secondary Teacher 0.549 0.047
Father Post-Secondary Teacher 0.466 0.050
Father Writer, Arts, etc. 0.670 0.063
Father Top Government position 0.897 0.220
Father Lawyer or Judge 0.819 0.049
Father Health Occupation .
0.640 0,054
Father Math or Science Occupation 0.678 0.059
Father Military 0.531 0,056
Father Service Occupation 0.521 0.061
Father Agriculture 0.333 0.062
Father Businessman (general) 0.752 0.043
Father Other Occupation 0.606 0.042
Father Management Occupation 0.886 0.040
Father Skilled Worker 0.577 0.045
Father Semi-skilled Worker 0.409 0.050
Father Unskilled Worker 0.339 0.063
Fathers Occupation Missing 0.376 0.082
Mother Clerical Occupation -0.098 0.019
Mother Management Consultant -0.393 0.654
Mother Sales -0.090 0.039
Mother Social Work 0.032 0.118
Mother Communications 0.009 0.142
Mother Policeman 0.388 0.341
Mother Financial Services -0.004 0.054
Mother Engineer -0.078 0.188
Mother Computer Occupation 0.149 0.222
Mother Physician 0.061 0.097
Mother Religious Worker -0.477 0.180
Mother Social Sciences -0.031 0.071
Mother Primary or Secondary Teacher -0.045 0.019
Mother Post-Secondary Teacher -0.062 0.055
Mother Writer. Arts, etc. -0.125 0.039
Mother Top Government Position 0.077 0.308
Mother Lawyer or Judge -0.018 0.168
Mother Health Occupation -0.081 0.023
Mother Math or Science Occupation -0.004 0.150
Mother Service Occupation -0.201 0.069
Mother Agriculture -0.043 0.281
Mother Business (general) 0.008 0.053
Mother Other Occupation -0.077 0.019
Mother Management Occupation 0.025 0.038
Mother Skilled Worker -0.140 0.052
Mother Semi-skilled Worker -0.176 0.039
Mother Unskilled Worker -0.299 0.070
Mothers Occupation Missing -0.054 0,08 1
R Squared 0.342
N 10,525
Notes: Baseline categories are "father not working" and "mother not working.' The equation also includes a constant term.
The primary source of parental occupation is the C&B institutional file, which is based on students' college applications.
Parental Income information is from responses to the Student Descriptive Questionnaire (SDQ), administered by the
Educational Testing Service (ETS) when the students took the SAT. Mother's and father's education are based
on responses to the C&B survey: "During your senior year in high school, what was the highest level of education
your mother (father) had attained?" Students' responses to the CIRP freshmen questionnaire were used to fill in parental
occupation and education if these variables were unavailable from the other sources.